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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
BUEHNER BLOCK COMPANY, a corpor- ,
ation, and SOUTH STATE BUILDERS
SUPPLY COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
NICK GLEZOS, HARRY H 0 N G,
CHARLES C. McDERMOND, COPA
SUPPER CLUB, a corporation, and VALLEY AMUSEMENT ENTERPRISES,
INCORPORATED, a corporation,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No. 8591

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because it appears to the plaintiffs and respondents that
the appellant has failed to accurately state the facts (rather he
has presenetd arguments from page 1 to page 59 inclusive),
and has misstated some material facts, and because he has recited from documents which are beyond the record in this case,
the respondents desire to restate the facts involved in this
particular appeal.
...
.)
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During the year 1954, the defendant, Nick Glezos, and
Katina Glezos, his wife, owned a piece of improved real estate
at approximately 3793 on South State Street in Salt Lake City
(R. 70), and at that time had leased the premises for a period
of six years to defendant and appellant, Harry Hong (Ex. 5)
(R. 49) . This lease covered the property referred to throughout the record and involved in this particular law suit. At the
time of the execution of the lease, and preceding the summer of
1954, defendant, Harry Hong, maintained a restaurant on the
premises which was commonly known as the Golden Pheasant
Restaurant (R. 49). At some date during 1954, the defendant,
C. C. McDermond, and the defendant, Hary Hong, as part12ers,

commenced the construction of an addition to the building
then located upon the premises, by adding a room in back to
be used as a private club (R. 50, 57, 70, 71, 72, 80, 81, 82,
91 and 92) . At the time of the commencement of the addition
to the property, defendant, Harry Hong, was then paying the
sum of $2 50.00 per month rental (R. 51). Subsequent to the
completion of the building, defendant, Nick Glezos, terminated
the lease \Yith defendant, Hong, (Ex. 6) and entered into a
month to month lease with Hong, leasing the old portion of
the building alone at only $125.00 per month (R. 51, 62).
The plaintiff. Buehner Block Company, furnished the blocks
for the construction of the rear portion of the building during
the period of July and August, 1954. All of these blocks were
ordered by defendant. C. C. McDern1ond, and it

\YJS

stipulated

that they \\·ere received and installed into the building referred
to iu this litigation, the reasonable value being fixed at the
sutn nf $605.51 (R. 47, Ex. 1). Plaintiff, South State Builders
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Supply Company, delivered materials which, it was stipulated,
\Vere installed and used in connection with the construction
of said building during the period of October and November,
1954, and the sum of $394.87 was a reasonable and fair figure
for the value of the materials furnished (R. 48, Ex. 3). Though
South State Builders Supply Company's invoices are shown as
billed to Spencer VanNoy, most of them are signed by defendant, McDermond, (Ex. 3), and it was stipulated, and the
invoices so show, that they were furnished and used in connectoin with the construction by McDermond upon the premises
leased by defendant, Hong, (R. 48). At the time the materials
were ordered, there was some concern by the plaintiff, Buehner
Block Company, as to exactly who was ordering the materials,
and although they could do no more than to identify Mr.
McDermond at that particular time, they knew the materials
. were being used for the Golden Pheasant Cafe addition (Ex.
1, R. 84-86).

r

r:
)~

Immediately following the construction of the back room,
defendant, Hong, was receiving $250.00 per month income on
the back room alone (R. 63). Thus, Hong obtained the front
portion, which he operated as a restaurant, without any additional cost to himself, since the lease of the whole building

J~

called for only $250.00 per month. Plaintiffs thereafter attempted numerous times to collect their accounts from the
I~
operators of the property and were unable to do so. Each
~~:~:
plaintiff thereafter filed a notice of lien to protect his rights
~~~

~:
~~

~[~~

(Ex. 2, 4), and on June 13, 1955, plaintiff, Buehner Block
Cotnpany, filed its complaint in this case (R. 1) setting forth
two causes of action. The first cause of action is a plea to

5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

hold the property liable for the improvements placed thereon,
and seeks a lien foreclosure. The second cause of action seeks
to hold the defendants, and each of them, liable for the items
sold and delivered to the property, and the reasonable value
therefor. Default judgments were taken by Buehner Block
Company against Charles C. McDermond, Copa Supper Club
and the Valley Amusement Enterprises, Incorporated. The
articles of incorporation of these defendants were neither
offered nor received in evidence.
On November 3, 1955, plaintiff, South State Builders Supply
Company, filed a complaint substantially the same as Buehner
Block Company's, and filed a motion to join the two causes
in one proceeding (R. 17-21). Defendants, Copa Supper Club
and Valley Amusement Enterprises, were served with summons,
though defendant, McDermond, was unserved, though
summons was issued (R. 24). Trial was held before the
Honorable Ray VanCott, Jr., a judge of the Third Judical
District Court, as a result of which judgment was entered
against defendant, Harry Hong, and herein appealed upon, and
a dismissal \Vas entered in favor of defendant, Nick Glezos.
Since there is no appeal taken from the dismissal, that matter
\vill not be referred to hereafter.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
For convenience, the argun1ents of appellant and defendant,
Harry Hnng, \\'ill be anS\Yered under the following headings:
1. 'l'llE COl\lPLAINTS STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION
At~AINST l)EFENDANT, HARRI'" HONG.
6
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II. THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL, COMPETENT EVIDENCE.
III. THERE WAS NO ERROR COMMITTED BY THE
COURT IN THE CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL.
IV. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT HONG'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COMPLAINTS STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST DEFENDANT, HARRY HONG.
The complaints of each of the plaintiffs herein are similar
in nature and therefore will be discussed as though there was
only one complaint filed. It should be noted, however, that at
no time did defendant, Hong, raise this defense as to the complaint of South State Builders Supply Company. Each complaint sets forth two causes of action.
(a) The first cause of action was drafted as a lien foreclosure against the defendant, Nick Glezos, and alleges that the
defendants, Harry Hong and others, claim some interest in the
property, which interest is subservient to the lien of plaintiffs.
This cause of action is well pleaded under our statute relating
to the foreclosure of mechanic's lien. U.C.A. 38-1-7 (1953)
requires that a notice of claim be recorded setting forth the
narr1e of the owner, if known, together with the name of the
person the material was furnished to, and the terms of the
7
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contract, specifying the time when the first and last materials
were furnished, and a description of the property sufficient
to charge it with a lien, and also setting forth the statement of
the demand, all of which had been compiled with, as is evidenced by the notices of lien, known as Exhibits 2 and 4, filed
in the record. An action for a lien foreclosure is in the nature
of an equitable action. This court has ruled on the question
of the parties to a lien foreclosure proceeding and whether or
not one who claims some right, title or interest in or to the
property is a necessary party. In so ruling the court held:
'' ... it is argued that the appellant is not a proper
party to this action. It may well be doubted whether
that objection can be raised by a general demurrer.
Waiving that point, however, we have already held that
under our statute any person who claims a mortgage
or other lien on premises on which mechanics' liens
are sought to be foreclosed in an action in equity may
be made a party, and his right to claim a lien on the
premises in question may be litigated in such an action.
Cain v. Parfitt, 158 Pac. 448. We see no reason to
change or modify our ruling in that regard. The complaint was not vulnerable to the demurrer for the
reason that appellant's claim to or interest in the property in question was not more specifically stated.
Enough was stated in the complaint to authorize the
company to make appellant a party to the action. The
court therefore, did not err in overruling the demurrer."
Badget· Coal. and Lut1lbe,- z·. Olson~ 50 Utah 307, 167
Pac. 680-681.
It is therefore obvious that the first cause of action pleaded

by the plaintiffs in their con1plaint does state a cause of action
~tgainst

the defcnd~tnt, I-Iarry Hong.

(b) It is further alleged in plaintiffs' first cause of action
8
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that the plaintiffs have a lien against whatever interest any
of the defendants claim in and to the property for which the
materials were furnished. Thus, it is alleged that the plaintiffs
claim a lien against the leasehold estate of Harry Hong, and
any of the other defendants. Our statute provides ( U.C.A.
38-1-3, (1953]):
((Such liens shall attach only to such interest as the
owner may have in the property, but the interest of the
lessee of a mining claim, mine or deposit, whether
working under bond or otherwise, shall for the purpose
of this chapter include products mined and excavated
and the same remain upon the premises included within
the lease."
The fact that the statute refers to the lien as attaching to the
interest of the ((owner" does not preclude the same lien from
attaching to a leasehold estate. ((Owner'' has been defined by
this court as including a person with an equitable interest. See
Garland v. Bear Lake and River Water W arks and Irrigation
Company, 9 Utah 350, 34 Pac. 368. (Affirmed 164 U.S. 1,
41 L. Ed. 327, 17 S. Ct. 7); Cary-Lombard Lumber Company
v. Partridge, 10 Utah 322, 37 Pac. 572. In the case of Ellis v.
Porter, 8 Utah 108, 29 Pac. 879, this court held that a mechanic's
lien may attach against a leasehold estate, and is not lost by
the purchase of such estate by the lessor, when the lessor has
knowledge of the improvements for which the lien is claimed.
The cases are numerous in which the courts hav:e held that a
mechanic(s lien may attach to a leasehold interest for supplying
labor or materials for the construction, repair or improvements
of buildings or other similar structures. See Annotation 42
A.L.R. 2d 687, Note I. ((Owner" in our statute should not be
limited to the owner of the fee only, but also include the
9
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owner of the leasehold estate. See National Gas Company v.
Ada and Metal Company, 185 Okla. 415, 93 P. 2d 529;
Benjamin v. Wilson, 34 ·Minn. 517, 26 N.W. 725; Choteau
v. Thompson, 2 Ohio St. 114.
(c) As to plaintiffs' second cause of action, defendants
are claimed liable for the reasonable value of materials furnished to defendants, and each of them, with their knowledge,
consent and approval, and to their benefit. The benefit to the
defendant, Hong, is quite obvious. Mter the back room portion
of the building was completed, and defendant, McDermond,
and the partnership were operating same, defendant, Hong, was
paid $250.00 per month for the back space alone, which was
the total rental sum that Hong was required to pay to Glezos
for the entire property (R. 63) , leaving Hong the former
restaurant portion to operate as he chose, free of rental obligation. Thus, it seems obvious that a cause of action is stated
against Harry Hong in the second cause of action.
"The doctrine of unjust enrichment for recovery in
quasi contract applies to situations \\'here there is no
legal contract but where the person sought to be charged
is in possession of money or property which in good
conscience and justice he should not retain, but should
deliver to another, the court imposing a duty to refund
the money or the use value of the property to the
person to 'vhom in good conscience it ought to belong."
Atltt~rt?Je t-'. Afoore-t,fcCort1la~:k Lines (C.C.A. 2d
N.Y.) 158 F. 2d 6_11. 170 A.L.R. 440; 46 Am. fur.
Rc.rtitutio11 a11d UnjuJt Enricht11ent. 1956, Supp. p. 10.
It has been further said: "\\'here one stands by in silence

and sees \\·ork done in the improvement of his premises, of
10
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which he accepts the benefit, a promise to pay therefor may
be implied." 17 C.J.S. 321, Contracts, Sec. 4 (c).
The matters alleged in the complaint state a claim upon
v1hich relief can be granted and the court did not err in refusing
to dismiss the complaint upon this ground. Moore's Federal

Practice, Vol. 2, p. 2245, says:
a complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any state of facts
which could be proved in support of tbe claim. Pleadrr •••

ings are to be liberally construed."
(d) At this point let us discuss and answer the defendant,
l-Iong, on the question of partnership being raised at the trial
and not in the pleadings. The issue of partnership may
be implied in the pleadings wherein it is alleged that all of the
defendants are obligated to the plaintiffs. Even assuming that
the pleadings do not allege partnership expressly, the issue can
still be tried where there is no objection to the introduction
of such evidence, and that is the case in this particular instance,
including the introduction by appellant himself of testimony
as to the existence or non-existence of a partnership (R. 93-94).

Rule 15 (b) U.R.C.P. provides:
~~When

issues not raised by the pleadings are tried
by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in
the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as
may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues rna y be made upon
motion of any party at any time even after judgrrtent;
but failure so to amend does not affect the results of
the trial of the issues. If evidence is objected tp at the
11
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trial on the ground that it is not within the issue made
by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings
to be amended when the presentation of the merits
of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting
party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of
such evidence wourd prejudice him in maintaining his
action or defense upon the merits. The court shall
grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence."
Professor Moore in his work entitled Moore's Federal
Practice, Vol. 3, discusses Rule 15 (b) and has the following
to say about this Rule:
"Rule 15 does three things. First, it facilitates amendments and the presentation of supplemental matter.
Second, it adopts the comprehensive and practical concept of cause of action heretofore discussed by the
adoption of the relation back doctrine, and coorelatively, it applies the doctrine to the statement of defense. Third, it recognizes that at the trial stage, pleadings should not be over-emphasized." Page 804).
HThe rule is not novel. It is based upon the better
federal practice at law and in equity, which prevailed
prior to the Federal Rules. It is, however, a clear statement of what constitutes good practice. It is not prohibitive of anything \vhich was before its adoption
permissible in the ufederal courts in the direction of
reaching desirable results." (Page 805).
"Rule 15 (b) can be separated into two parts. First,
if issues are tried with the express or implied consent
of the parties, 'they shall be treated in all respects as
if they had been raised in the pleadings.' Some state
c:ourts, strongly imbued \Vith the necessity of correct
\vritten pleadings, have felt that issues outside the
plcadin~~s could not be tried even \vith express consent.
But the doctrine that the 'cause of action' may be
changed by the introduction of evidence \Yithout ob·
1~
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

jection was followed in the federal courts before the
adoption of the Federal Rules; in effect, many cases
at law broadened the definition of cause of action so
that it included any legal rights arising from the occurrence set forth in the complaint. Rule 15 (b) does not
even limit the amendment to the transaction or occurrence set forth in the pleadings; the only apparent
limitation on the parties is that the court have jurisdiction over the matter tried, although as a matter of
practice issues tried by implied or express consent
ordinarily do arise from the same general set of facts
set forth in the complaint. Thus a plaintiff may sue
on one contract and recover on another; rna y sue on
the theory of respondent superior and recover on the
theory of the vicarious liability of an employer of an
independent contractor; or may sue for patent infringement and also recover for unfair competition. The fact
that this involves a change in the nature of the cause
of action, or the legal theory of the action, is immaterial so long as the opposing party has not been
prejudiced in presenting his case." (Page 843.)
((While an amendment to conform to evidence may
be made at any time on motion of any party, even in
the appellate court, the lack of an amendment does not
affect the judgment in any way. In effect, therefore, the
parties may, by express consent, or by the introduction
of evidence without objection, amend the pleadings at
will." (Page 846).
We feel this sufficiently explains and adequately answers
the raising of the issue of partnership at the trial.

POINT II.
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBST ANTTAL, COMPETENT EVIDENCE.
13
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It is the contention of plaintiffs that the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law are supported by substantial competent evidence, which evidence gives rise to five separate
conclusions of liability with respect to the defendant, Harry
l-Iong. Those five conclusions are as follows:
1. A mechanic's lien foreclosure.
2. An express contract between plaintiffs and the defe~d

ant, Charles C. McDermond, and liability for the performance
of said contract upon defendant, Harry Hong, by reason of
the partnership existing between McDermond and Hong and
others.
3. A contract implied in fact between Plaintiffs and defendant, Charles C. McRermond, and liability upon defendant,
Harry Hong, by reason of the partnership as above set forth.
4. Liability by contract implied in law with respect to
defendant, Charles C. McDermond, and liability upon defend,-·
ant, Hong, by reason of the partnership above set forth.
5. Liability with respect to defendant, Hong, by reason of
contract implied in law.
All five of the above conclusions are supported by substantial con1petent evidence. All five of the above conclusions
are supported by Findings of Fact. A sumn1ation of the evi'"Jence sho\vS that 01arles C. ~IcDermond \Yas the admitted
builder of a building upon the pren1ises located at 3793 South
State Street in Salt Lake City. (R. 50, 57). Defendant Harry
1Ion,!;, \\'~Is the stipulated lessee of said pretnises for a period
nf six )'L'~trs (R. ·l9, Ex. 5). Plaintiffs duly and properly filed
14
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notices of mechanic's lien. (Ex. 2 & 4) . Defendant, McDermond,
ordered, or caused to be ordered, the materials supplied by
plaintiffs. (R. 50, 84-86, Ex. 3 & 4). Defendant, Hong, was
the partner of defendant, McDermond, in the construction and
operation of the building by reason of (a) his own testimony
and his admission to defendant Glezos that he intended to
become a partner (R. 59, 71, 72); (b) his admission to witness
Watson that he was a partner ( R. 81) ; (c) his admission to
witness Watson that he had agreed to pay the debts of the
project (R. 80) ; (d) his payment in fact of a partnership debt
(R. 92) ; and (e) the very circumstances of the project whereby
his restaurant was disrupted and enlarged and improved for
the benefit of the partnership (R. 63, 67, 68). The benefit to
the premises was made with the knowledge, consent, and approval (implied or in fact) of defendant, Hong, by which said
benefit he has been enriched (R. 50, 51, 52).
1. The filing of mechanic's liens by plaintiffs, and the

actions to foreclose same within the time prescribed by law
are all supported by the record (Ex. 2 & 4). The right of a
lien claimant to foreclose a lien with respect to a leasehold
interest is fully discussed in Point I (a) and (b) above. See
Garland v. Bear Lake and River Waterworks and Irrigation
Company, supra.
2. The record supports an express contract between plaintiffs

and defendant, McDermond. All of plaintiff's, Buehner Block,
material was ordered by McDermond (R. 84-86). The great
bulk of plaintiff's, South State Builders, material was ordered
by defendant, Mc;Dermond (Ex. 3). It is an established principle of evidence that one's admissions or declarations against
15
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his own proprietary interests are admissible against him while
his own self-serving declarations are not admissible in his favor.
See 20 Am. fur., Evidence, Sec. 544, p. 460. Accordingly, the fact
that a certain person was a member of a partnership, and therefore liable for the firm debts at a specified time may be proved
by his admissions that he was a partner. Herman Kahn Company v. Bowden, 80 Ark. 23, 96 S.W. 126; Payette Lumber Co. v.
Sarret, 38 Idaho 278, 221 Pac. 130; Dawson v. Pogue, 18
Ore. 94, 22 Pac. 637; Hobbs v. Virginia National Bank, 147
Va. 802, 28 S.E. 46; Annotation 20 L.R.A. 495; Smith v. Butt
and Harden, 281 Ky. 127, 135 S.W. 2d 67, 157 A.L.R. 648. In
addition, it is well established that the existence of a partnership may be implied from circumstances, acts and conduct.
Bridgeman v. Winsness, 34 Utah 383, 98 Pac. 186. The record
is replete with acts and conduct on the part of defendant,
Hong, leading inescapably to the conclusion of a partnership
with the builder, McDermond.
3. Defendant, McDermond, is liable to plaintiffs in contract implied in fact. A contract implied in fact arises where
the intention of the parties is not expressed, but an agreement
in fact is implied or presumed from their acts, according to
the ordinary course of dealings and the common understanding
of n1en. 17 C.J.S. 318, Contl'acts, Sec. 46. An implied contract
is one where the mutual intent is manifested by particular acts
and attendant circumstances. Gleason r. Salt Lake City, 94
Utah 1, 74 P.2d 1225.
"Neither a ,,·ritten offer and acceptance nor oral
l'ounterparts are essential to establish a contractural
rl'lationship, for unatnbiguous conduct of one party
h)\vards the other, under such circumstances, as clearly
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to manifest an intention that one party perform and
that the other party compensate for such performance,
is sufficient."

Kimball Elevator Co.} Inc. v. Elevator Supplies Co.} Inc., 2
U.2d 289, 272 P.2d 583; McCollum v. Clothier} 121 Utah 311,
241 P.2d 468. We have no argument with appellant's cases
cited for the proposition that there can be no implied contract
where an express contract exists between the same parties, but
contend there is no conflict between the express and implied
contracts herein.
4. The theory that the builder, McDermond, is liable in
contract implied in law, and hence his partner, Harry Hong,
is also liable, is amply supported by the evidence (as shown
at the beginning of this argument). The materials were furnished with the knowledge, consent and approval of McDermond (Ex. 1 & 3, R. 50, 51, 52, 84-86. McDermond
was obviously enriched by the addition to the premises which
he was operating for profit (R. 63, 64). The authorities supporting a conclusion of law of unjust enrichment under these
findings are amply discussed in Point I (c) above.
5. By the same token, there is substantial evidence within
the record (as shown at the beginning of this argument) to
support the conclusion of liability upon defendant, Hong, by
reason of his own unjust enrichment, irrespective of any partnership with the builder, McDermond. Plaintiffs are not
officious intermeddlers. They furnished materials for the improvement of Hong's premises with the knowledge, consent
and approval of Hong who stands by in silence and sees work
done in the improvement of his premises and accepts the
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benefits thereto. A promise to pay therefor may be implied
in law. See 17 C.J.S. 321, supra.

POINT III.
THERE WAS NO ERROR COMMITTED BY THE
COURT IN THE CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL.
An examination of the record will show that the plaintiffs'
case in chief was presented, and plaintiff rested (R. 86). At
this time. Mr. Clyde, the attorney for the defendant Glezos,
presented a mention to dismiss the action against the defendant,
Glezos, and argument with the court was had on this motion.
During this argument the court said, ctNow as to this other
phase of it, Mr. Ashworth, this Mr. Watson lends some doubt
about the matter as to Mr. Hong" (R. 88). Mr. Ashworth
then commenced arguing the case in favor of Mr. Hong. At
no time did Mr. Ashworth object to the court's failing to
permit him to put on any evidence nor did Mr. Ashworth
offer to introduce any \Yitnesses or documents. It is true that
during the argument between Mr. Ashworth and Mr. Conder
and the Court about the position of Mr. Hong, Mr. Watson
stood up in the back of the courtroom and the Court stated,
nMr. Watson, do you \vant to say something?" Mr. Watson
ans\\·ered, nYes." The Court. HJust come in here" (R. 88).
It should be noted that Mr. \\ratson testified for the plaintiff
in the plaintiffs· case in chief, and had been previously sworn
and testified ~ts a \\'itness for the plaintiffs. It \vas after the
direct cx;unination and cross-exatnination of l\fr. \\ratson, and
during the argulnent of counsel in connection \vith the tnotion
18
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to dismiss by Mr. Grezos, that Mr. Watson indicated to the
Court that he had something further to say (R. 88). Any
statements made by Mr. Watson as to what Mr. McDermond
had said were of course heresay and objected to by Mr. Ashworth, and at no time have the plaintiffs made any claim for
the statements, since there is substantial competent testimony
as to the existence of the partnership in the conversations and
statements made by Mr. Hong to Mr. Watson and others. Mr.
Ashworth was given ample opportunity by the court to present
his case as he desired, the court stating, ((Do you desire to
put more testimony on Mr. Ashworth?" (R. 93). Mr. Ashworth then called Mr. Harry Hong to the stand to testify in
his own behalf, even though he had been previously sworn
and examined by his counsel. Mr. Ashworth then asked Mr.
Hong several questions on direct examination, including testimony as to the existence or non-existence of a partnership
(R. 93-94), and cross-examination and redirect examinatiov.
were all had of Mr. Hong. Thus, the court, never, at any time!
interferred with Mr. Ashworth's proper presentation of his
case, and likewise Mr. Ashworth never raised an objection
that he was not being given, or had not been given an ample
opportunity to put on any testimony that he desired in connection with this case. The power of the court to examine witnesses is summarized as follows:
((E~amination by Court or Jury.-A trial judge has
the nght to propound such questions to witnesses as
may be necessary to elicit pertinent facts, in order that
the truth may be established, although some reviewing
courts have declared that the practice of so doing
except ~hen absolu~ely necessary should be discouragec_r
Accordtngly, the tnal court has power to recall a wit-
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ness who has been examined, or ask him leading questions, and he may elicit any relevant and material evidence, without regard to its effect, whether beneficial
or prejudical to one party or the other. Indeed, it has
been declared to be the duty of the court to propound
such questions to reluctant witnesses as will strip them
of the subterfuges to which they resort to evade telling
the truth. The extent to which such examination shall
be conducted rests in the direction of the judge, the
exercise of which will not be controlled unless abused."
58 Anz. fur., Witnesses, Sec. 557, p. 310.

POINT IV.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT HONG'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
Defendant Hong's motion for a new trial alleged the
following grounds:
1. Insufficient evidence to justify the judgment;

2. Surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guard-

ed against;
3. New1y discovered evidence; and
4. Error in law.
His brief, however, does not argue the insufficiency of the
evidence, and claims a new ground (for the first tin1e) of misconduct of the trial judge. We feel it unnecessary to further
discuss the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgn1ent,
and only con1ment briefly that the trial \vas conducted fairly
and itnpartially in all particulars, and that the trial judge \vas
20
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guilty of no misconduct which entitled defendant, Hong, to a

new trial.
With respect to surprise, defendant's claim is that plaintiffs'
failure to plead partnership liability surprised him, and he
could not guard against it. It is interesting to note that nowhere
in the record does defendant object to the introduction of any
testimony regarding partnership, and in fact, does present
evidence himself regarding this issue (R. 93-94). It is elementary that this is not such surprise as is contemplated by the rule
as grounds for new trial. Flanders v. Hunter, 60 Utah 314,
208 Pac. 526; Steward Mining Co. v. Coulter, 3 Utah 174, 5
Pac. 557, and that issues tried by express or implied consent
shall be treated, in all respects, as if they had been raised in the
pleadings. Rule 15 (b) U.R.C.P.
With respect to alleged newly discovered evidence, defendant supported his motion with affidavits of defendant, Hong,
and his counsel (R. 102, 103, 104 and 105). The substance
of said affidavits is that ((Plaintiff's witnesses * * * perjured
themselves and that defendant has discovered new evidence
* * * being bank records and statements * * * and also copy
of federal income tax * * * which could not be produced at
the trial." Though it is difficult to see how such evidence
would show the absence of partnership or the absence of payment by defendant to witness Kinser, it is obvious that under
any circumstances such evidence would be merely cumulative
or tending to impeach adverse witnesses. It is well established
that such ((newly discovered evidence" is not the evidence
contetnplated by the rule governing new trials. Klopenstine tJ.
1-layes, 20 Utah 45, 57 Pac. 712; Jensen v. Logan City, 89 Utah
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347, 57 P.2d 708; Sowder v. W ardy Oil Corp., 231 F.2d 9
(CCA lOth).
The only error in law defendant alleges the trial judge
committed is that the court found that defendant, Hong, agreed
to pay the debts of another without having done so in writing,
in violation of the Statute of Frauds. Of course, there is no
such objection in the record to any of the testimony, but it is
elementary partnership law that a partnership debt, and the
resulting liability of the individual partners, is not the debt of
another, but rather by the very terms of the Uniform Partnership Act, a debt of such individual partner, U.C.A. 48-1-12,
( 1953). In addition, as set forth in Point II above, the evidence
adequately supports findings of liability on the basis of implied
contract, which, of course, is outside the scope of the Statute
of Frauds.
Despite the above, it is well established in this jurisdiction
that with respect to a trial court's failure to grant or deny a
motion for new trial, only an abuse of discretion will be examined by this court. See Ct·elin z:. T hotnas, .: ___ Utah 2d ____ ,
247 P.2d 264.
CONCLUSION
Respondents submit that the trial below was conducted
fairly and without error, and that the judgment should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
DEAN E. CONDER
DELBERT ~1. DRAPER, JR.
Attonzeys fo,- Respondents
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